SECOND DIVISION
EMMA
P. NUGUID, G.R. No. 150785
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
CLARITA
S. NICDAO,[1]
Respondent. Promulgated:
September
15, 2006
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D E C I
S I O N
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in
CA-G.R. No. 23054:
WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed
Decision dated May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated January 11, 1999 of
the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
Bataan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO
is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner seeks a review of the
decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent
Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of
violation of BP 22,[3]
this petition involves the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx
Accused
Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed
the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal
complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof,
[respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached
[petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some
obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close
relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her
money. Thus, every month, she was
persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached
P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00,
[respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated Hermosa Savings Bank
(HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can
deposit the check:
|
Check No. |
Amount
|
|
|
|
|
7277 |
P100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
7348 |
150,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
12118 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
8812 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
12102 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
7255 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
2286 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
8128 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
7254 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
7278 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
4540 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
4523 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
12103 |
50,000.00 (Exhibit
“A”) |
|
7294 |
100,000.00 (Exhibit “A”) |
|
|
P1,150,000.00 |
In June 1997, [petitioner] together
with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums
[above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the
indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977,
[petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by
her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds
(DAIF).
A verbal and written
demand was made upon [respondent] to pay
the amount represented by the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a
complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent]. [4](Citation
omitted)
After
petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases[5] (docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for violation of BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000,
corresponding warrants of arrest were
issued against respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She
pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
In
a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan
found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to
pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to
one year for each violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On
appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by
the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan. Respondent
elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision
of the lower courts and acquitted respondent. According
to the CA, certain substantial facts were
overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly considered,
justified a different conclusion on the case.[6]
Petitioner
now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly
liable to her for the sum of P1,150,000.
In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her
in the aggregate amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been
paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a
crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance
of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by
the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the
offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no
private person injured by the crime[7]). What
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to
repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.[8]
Extinction
of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.[9]
On
one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to
say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum
prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Laws are created to achieve a
goal intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom
the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.[10]
On
the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the
Civil Code.[11] A person acquitted of a criminal charge,
however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required
in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence[12]). In order to be completely free from civil
liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not
commit the offense.[13] If the
acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly
liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.[14] It may
only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.[15]
Acquittal
will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused’s
liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted.[16]
In this petition, we find no reason
to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed
civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment.
The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was
acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of
civil liability:
[Petitioner] does
not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the
stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a
previous obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented
by the prosecution to substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous
obligation involving the same amount for which the demand draft was given.
Except for this bare allegation, which is self-serving, no documentary evidence
was ever adduced that there were previous transactions involving the subject
amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted
having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but argues
that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that
[petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a
daily basis. xxx In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the
back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as
testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie Tolentino
and Jocelyn Nicdao.
Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15
reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the
amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further
payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear
that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the
P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00,
the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never
rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover,
we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan
obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx xxx xxx
By
and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long
before the encashment of the subject checks.
A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a
pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was
extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the
clear and
convincing
documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.[17]
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] The Court of Appeals was impleaded as a respondent but we have excluded it pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 53.
[3] Anti-Bouncing Checks Law.
[4] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 39-40; MCTC Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471, id., pp. 68-69. See also Petition, id., pp. 21-22.
[5] Samson Ching, petitioner’s partner, had earlier instituted a
criminal case for eleven counts of violation of BP 22 against Nicdao, this time involving the sum of P20,950,000.
It was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443.
In Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443, Hon. Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court found Nicdao guilty of the charges.
Nicdao filed two separate petitions for review with the CA.
The petition for review of the RTC decision on Criminal Case Nos. DH-848-99 to
DH-858-99 was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 23055. Meanwhile, the petition involving
Criminal Case Nos. DH-859-99 to DH-872-99, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 23054, is
the subject matter of this petition.
The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for consolidation of the two
petitions on October 13, 1999 pursuant to Section 7 (b) (1) of the 1988 Revised
Rules of the CA.
Without
resolving and acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA, through Associate
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero,
decided CA-G.R. No. 23055 on November 22, 1999. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision and acquitted Nicdao.
Samson Ching questioned the civil aspect of the CA decision by way of petition for review on certiorari before this Court. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 141181. At the time of the filing of the present petition, G.R. No. 141181 was allegedly still pending with the Court’s First Division.
[6] Rollo, p. 52.
[7] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law 1 (2001), p. 876. Citation omitted.
[8] See also Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328, 333.
[9] Reyes supra note 7, at 878, citing Sec. 2, par. 4, Rule III, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[10] Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code and Special Penal Laws (2002), p. 692. Citations omitted. See also Ngo v. People, G.R. No. 155815, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 522, 530-533; King v. People, 377 Phil. 692 (1999); Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.
[11] Id., p. 298. Civil Code, Art. 1156.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.,
p. 302. See also Reyes, supra note 7, at 879.
Civil liability may exist, although the accused is not
held criminally liable, in the following cases:
1.
Acquittal on
reasonable doubt (Civil Code,
Art. 29)
2.
Acquittal from a
cause of nonimputability (Revised Penal Code, Art. 101)
3.
Acquittal in the
criminal action for negligence (Civil
Code, Art. 2177)
4.
When there is
only civil responsibility (De Guzman v. Alva, 51 O.G. 1311)
5. In cases of independent civil actions (Civil Code, Arts. 31-34).
[17] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 48-52. Citations omitted.